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‘Despite many currents and cross currents, continuity is perhaps the most
impressive phenomenon in the history of economic doctrines’.
1 These words
by a very experienced economic historian are still extremely relevant, also
for economic policy. But continuity in economics is of a peculiar and cycli-
cal kind. It does not manifest itself in smooth incremental transitions, but
rather in the recurrence of similar sets of ideas in similar contexts over time.  
The economics profession and what is considered ‘best practice’ economic
policy is, then, decidedly cyclical. Its cyclicality appears to follow the same
type of mechanisms of ‘destabilizing stability’ described by US economist
Hyman Minsky as leading up to financial crises.
2 In the financial sector,
when things are stable and improving over long periods of time, bank rou-
tines of risk evaluation grow increasingly lax, and in the end credit is given
to people who are not even able to pay interest on the loans they are given
(‘Ponzi financing’, as with subprime loans). In other words, long periods of
stability lead to increasing vulnerability: to Minsky’s ‘destabilizing stability’. 
Similar cycles are at work as regards our understanding of economics and
industrial policy: long periods of economic progress in the core countries lead
to increasingly abstract and irrelevant economic theories. ‘Bad’ theories – par-
ticularly as they are applied outside the economic core – are allowed to dom-
inate the discipline for long periods of time because the underlying economy
is strong enough to withstand their poisonous influences, but, eventually, real-
ity catches up and disaster ensues. This brings less abstract and more rele-
vant economic theories and practices back; mindless laissez-faire is abandoned
and more active economic governance again becomes acceptable. These turn-
ing points can, after their most famous manifestation, be referred to as ‘1848
moments’, and they tend to be caused by economic crises, just as the 1848
turning point followed upon the severe financial crisis of 1847.
In his 1848 Principles of Political Economy John Stuart Mill describes such
moments well:  
It often happens that the universal beliefs of one age of mankind
– a belief from which no one was, nor without an extraordinary
effort of genius and courage could at the time be free – becomes
to a subsequent age so palpable an absurdity, that the only diffi-
culty then is to imagine how such a thing can ever have appeared
credible...It  looks  like  one  of  the  crude  fancies  of  childhood,
instantly corrected by a word from any grown person.
3
2
1 Raymond de Roover, ‘Scholastic Economics: Survival and Lasting Influence from the 16
th Century to
Adam Smith’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69, 1955, 161-190.
2  Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
3 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1848, 3.Similar economic situations and constellations appear and – even centuries
apart – reappear, and similar approaches tend to be reinvented. Sometimes
the new theories refer to previous theories addressing similar problems,
sometimes not. As regards economic policy, periods of profound qualitative
understanding alternate with periods dominated by abstract theories, when
knowledge  previously  recognised  as  valuable  is  unlearned.  As  we  shall
describe below, since the 1760s, two different approaches to economics –
two different parallel streams – have competed for attention and promi-
nence. Sometimes one dominates, sometimes the two streams are seen as
complementary, and theoretical pluralism is seen as a natural thing. During
these times of pluralism, the economists’ toolbox is at its largest.
In other words, long period of economic progress in the core nations create
excessively  abstract  theories,  which  –  in  their  turn  –  create  economic
havoc, first in the economic periphery and later closer to the core. These
abstract theories create social crises, and the theoretical turning-points we
have labelled ‘1848 moments’.
4
In the first wave of irrelevance, the impressive economic growth of the
Enlightenment climaxed in the economic school of Physiocracy which –
contrary to all previous experience – recommended free trade under all cir-
cumstances. (Table 1) In Paris Physiocracy-based free trade in grain made
it more profitable to carry grain out of Paris in order to speculate in rising
prices, than to produce bread for the population of Paris. Free trade caused
a serious shortage of bread and famine.
Table 1. Three Waves of Irrelevant and Economically Destructive Theories
3
4 Erik S. Reinert, ‘The Terrible Simplifiers: Common Origins of Financial Crises and Persistent Poverty
in Economic Theory and the new ‘1848 Moment’’, UN DESA Working paper No. 88, December
2009, downloadable at http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2009/wp88_2009.pdf
In fact, the French Revolution broke out when news reached Paris that the anti-
Physiocrat Jacques Necker had lost his position as French Minister of Finance.
In practice, the Physiocrats lost almost every theoretical and practical battle
except the one in today’s textbooks in the history of economic thought, where
they hold a position which is completely unwarranted if one observes the eco-
nomic policies that were actually carried out in Europe at the time. 
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1995+A second wave of ‘destabilizing stability’ in economics started with the pub-
lication of David Ricardo’s Principles of Economics and Taxation in 1817.
Attempting  to  keep  England’s  virtual  world  monopoly  in  manufacturing,
Ricardo produced an economic theory which justified the prohibitions on
manufacturing in the colonies, postulating free trade as an agent of eco-
nomic harmony. This wave peaked in the England’s Repeal of the Corn Laws
in 1846, discontinuing British protection of agriculture in an effort to prevent
other nations from protecting their manufacturing sector. A massive finan-
cial crisis in 1847 and revolutions in 1848 in all large European countries –
with the exception of Russia and Great Britain – put an end to the second
wave of ‘economics as a harmony-producing machinery’. 
1848 produced three important books all critical of the economic order legit-
imized by Ricardian economics: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ Communist
Manifesto (Marx  was  so  radical  that  he  was  forced  to  flee  Germany  for
England), Bruno Hildebrand’s National Economics in the Present and in the
Future, (Hildebrand was a liberal who had to flee Germany for Switzerland in
order to escape the death penalty), and John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political
Economy. From completely different political angles, all three books attacked
the mainstream economics of the day for suffering from the same weakness-
es of which we accuse today’s mainstream. By attempting to make econom-
ics a much more accurate science than it merits, mainstream economics has
created economic disasters: both financial crisis and poverty in the periphery.
All three 1848 books understood that national wealth required industrializa-
tion, recanting Ricardo’s trade theory, the very same theory which at present
– in its most simplistic form – provides the basis of the world economic order
that locks poor nations into a comparative advantage of being poor.  
John Stuart Mill – celebrated today as an important liberal (in the European
sense) – acknowledged that poor nations needed manufacturing industry
and recommended ‘infant industry protection’. In a speech to Belgian work-
ers  in  1848,  Karl  Marx  was  pleased  with  Ricardo’s  free  trade  theory
because premature trade liberalization would create poverty and hasten rev-
olution. Premature trade liberalization may lock nations into monoculture
and undiversified economic structures that prevent democracy. A nation
without a large division of labour and a web of increasing returns industries
is unlikely to be able to support a democratic system. Enlightenment econ-
omists  and  philosophers  were  very  aware  of  the  fact  that  increasing
returns, industrialization and democracy go hand in hand.
The long period of economic boom after World War II created a new move-
ment towards excessive abstraction and irrelevance in economics. The first
countries to be hit by a wave of falling real wages – already from the mid-
1970s – were Latin America (with the exception of Brazil). The financial cri-
sis starting in 2007 has led to a movement similar to that of 1848: the grow-
45
ing crisis has shattered the belief in self-regulating markets and led to a new
and much more positive view of economic policy and of the role of the
state.
5 A recent front cover of the most ideologically liberalist of all interna-
tional journals – The Economist – announcing that ‘The State Goes Back into
Business’
6 is typical of today’s Zeitgeist. The August 2010 cover is an
appropriate follow-up of the same magazine’s cover of July 18, 2009, which
depicted a book entitled ‘Modern Economic Theory’ experiencing a melt-
down like an ice-cream abandoned on the beach on a hot summer’s day,
with the subtitle: ‘Where it went wrong – and how the crisis is changing it’. 
This is a true 1848 moment: as with the financial crisis in 1847, econom-
ics changed completely in 1848. (Table 2) When comparing Russia with the
other BRIC countries later in this paper, we shall argue that Russia’s timing
in the cycle of economic theory – and the resulting economic policy – has
been particularly unfortunate. 
Table 2. The Present Shift in Economic Focus: Before and after ‘The 1848 Moment’





Distribute capital (‘aid’) in order to 
eradicate poverty
Perfect competition 
Economics strongly ideologically biased. The
Cold War polarization maintained: markets
are good and the state bad and vice-versa  
Economic activities qualitatively alike
Gross national product/capita
Economics as a science defined as the use
of certain tools
The market as an ideological goal





Economic facts and their contexts
Distribute production in order to 
eradicate poverty
Poverty eradication needs the high wages
and the capital formation that only
dynamic imperfect competition creates
Separation of analysis and ideology, 
‘technocratic’ analysis
Economic activities qualitatively different
Real wages
Economists’ toolbox extended any
approach which is relevant  
The market as a tool for wealth creation
5 See, e.g. Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds, Industrial Policy and Develop-
ment, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
6 The Economist, August 7-13, 2010. The Other Canon Approach: A Brief Description
This document is written in what we refer to as The Other Canon Approach
to economics, indicated in the right-hand column in Table 2. This is the
pragmatic and experience-based type of theory to which economics return
after the excesses of abstraction that cause the ‘1848 moments’ and the
social havoc that accompanies them. A key feature of the Other Canon
approach is that economic activities are seen as being qualitatively different
in terms of their ability to generate economic growth and economic devel-
opment. (Figure 1) The Quality Index of Economic Activities developed by
The Other Canon ranks economic activities based on their potential to gen-
erate wealth. Founded on Schumpeterian (evolutionary) and Keynesian prin-
ciples, on the principles of the historical schools of economics and on the
experience-based economics taught at Harvard Business School, The Other
Canon approach sees economic development and high wages as emanat-
ing from a combination of three factors: technological change, increasing
returns, and the synergies originating in a large division of labour. Compared
to today’s economics The Other Canon represents a marked shift in focus
away from trade to production, and away from perfect information as a
standard and a stated goal, to Schumpeterian dynamic imperfect competi-
tion as being the goal to strive for. As in the theories of Thorstein Veblen,
economic institutions are seen as being the result of the habits formed
around a productive structure. Thus the arrow of causality runs mainly from
changes in the productive sector to changing institutions, not – as is often
assumed by the Washington Institutions – that institutional change per se
takes the lead. In our view institutions are best formed simultaneously with
a change in a nation’s productive structure. 
67
Figure 1. The Quality Index of Economic Activities  8
Learning from successful Russian Strategies of the Past: 
Rounds I and II
Russia faced an economic challenge with the change of economic model in
1991. When Russia now faces a new challenge in whether or not to join
the WTO, we argue that it is necessary to draw important lessons from
what  happened  to  Russia’s  economic  structure  after  1991.  President
Medvedev has rightly called for the modernization of Russia, and we sug-
gest that basic principles of modernization can be learned from two previ-
ous processes of modernization in Russia. In both cases we draw parallels
between Russia and Germany, a nation which was also a ‘latecomer’.           
Modernizing Russia: Round I
7
Under Peter the Great (1672-1725) Russia entered a first successful period
of modernization, when Russia emulated the best organizational practices
of western absolutism and – in particular – the economic structure of the
Dutch Republic.
8 Russia followed the same strategy as that recommended
by the leading German economist at the time, Veit von Seckendorff (1626-
1692). Just as Peter did, Seckendorff visited Holland, and came back with
clear ideas that national wealth could only be produced by emulating the
economic structure of that country: by creating a diversified manufacturing
sector – maximizing the division of labour – and thus creating the economic
synergies that characterize rich countries.  Seckendorff’s textbook in eco-
nomic strategy – Der Teutsche Fürstenstaat – was first published in 1656
and remained in print for 100 years.
9
Emulating the Dutch economic structure was what all successful countries
did during the Enlightenment, with England in the lead. English economist
Joshua Child opens his 1668 book with a comment on ‘the prodigious
increase of the Netherlanders’ which is ‘the envy of the present and may
be the wonder of all future generations. And yet, the means whereby they
have thus advanced themselves, are sufficiently obvious, and in a great
measure imitable by most other nations…’
10
7 This section, and our understanding of Russian history in general, have been greatly assisted by
an unpublished paper by Georgi Derluguian of Northwestern University, ‘Five centuries of Russian
Modernizations’. 
8  On  how  European  countries  emulated  the  Dutch  Republic  at  the  time,  see  Erik  S.  Reinert,
‘Emulating  Success:  Contemporary  Views  of  the  Dutch  Economy  before  1800’,  in  Oscar
Gelderblom, ed., The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic, Farham: Ashgate, 2009, 19-39. 
9 On Seckendorff and the economic strategies of the German states, see Erik S. Reinert, ‘A Brief
Introduction to Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626-1692)’, European Journal of Law and Econo-
mics, 19, 2005, 221-230.
10 Quoted in Erik S. Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich … and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor,
London: Constable, 2007. 9
What did the foreign visitors learn from studying Holland? First of all they
learned that economic activities where qualitatively different: there were
‘good’  economic  activities  which  caused  generalized  welfare,  and  there
were ‘bad’ economic activities, which caused poverty of the masses. These
characteristics are outlined in Table 3.  
Table 3. Characteristics of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Economic Activities   
In addition it is clear that foreign observers in Holland – as Peter the Great
or  Veit  von  Seckendorff  –  observed  important  dynamic  synergies  that
resulted from the great division of labour, the systemic effects that today
are referred to as a ‘National Innovation System’.  
In Figure 2 we attempt to reconstruct what a foreign visitor would have
observed in Delft in Holland at the time of Peter the Great’s visit: an inno-
vation system built around a great division of labour between many manu-
facturing industries, around the navy and warfare, the production of luxury
goods,  and  on  the  ‘idle  curiosity’  of  the  scientists  so  typical  of  the
Enlightenment. 
Good (Schumpeterian) Activities
Subject to increasing returns






Creates a middle class
Technical change leads to higher




Bad (Malthusian) Activities     







Technical change tends to lower
price to consumer
Creates few synergiesFigure 2. Delft, Holland in the 1600s. An Innovation System based on Diversity
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Modernizing Russia: Round II 
A second round of modernizing Russia was the extensive industrialization
presided  over  by  the  very  influential  policy-maker  Sergei  Witte  (1849-
1915), who served under the last two emperors of Russia. In principle, the
industrialization process spearheaded by Witte had the same goals as that
of Peter the Great, but in a very different technological context (in a differ-
ent techno-economic paradigm). The key infrastructure at the time of Peter
the Great was ships, and Peter concentrated on building the Russian navy.
The key infrastructure at the time of Witte was railroads, and Witte built
the trans-Siberian railway. The principles were the same – also those listed
in Table 3 – but the technological context was different.   
Also in the case of Witte there is a parallel with Germany, with German
economist Friedrich List (1789-1846), whose texts Witte translated into
Russian. 
We suggest in this document that today’s modernization of Russia – which
we have labeled Modernizing Russia: Round III – has to follow the same
principles as did Rounds I and II: the factors listed in Table 3 are still very
much at work, and – as we shall see – the ideology that ruled during the
1990s did considerable damage to Russia’s productive structure. This is
particularly evident when we compare Russia to the other BRIC countries.            11
Russia and the other BRIC Countries
The term ‘BRIC countries’ – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – traces its
roots to investment banking, Goldman Sachs coined the term in 2001. The
idea of large emerging economies catching up with, and challenging, the
West has captured social scientists and policy-makers alike. However, the
sheer size and different historical legacies dictate that there are enormous
differences between the BRIC economies. Russia’s situation is in three ways
unique among the BRIC countries. First, Russia was an industrialized nation
long before the others, secondly, it experienced unprecedented economic
decline in the 1990s and by 2008 Russia barely reached the GDP level of
1989;
11 thirdly, unlike Brazil, China, India and in fact most of the develop-
ing world, Russia is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
These  unique  features  beg  the  following  questions  that  this  document
seeks to (at least tentatively) answer: first, what is the structural legacy of
the decline in the 1990s in terms of technological and industrial capabilities
in Russia; and second, what can and should Russia learn from the WTO
experience of the rest of the BRIC economies until today. We argue, in brief,
that while the decline of the 1990s is relatively well-known and docu-
mented on the macro-level (GDP) and more controversially in some of its
micro-level and sociological impacts,
12 there seems to be little awareness
of the magnitude of devastation that took place during this period within
Russia’s industry. Along with a massive increase in income from natural
resources, a partial disintegration of the R&D system, and a greatly dimin-
ished policy capacity, the structural changes of the 1990s continue to pose
grave challenges to Russia’s economic policy making. In fact, in many areas
Russia’s technological and industrial capabilities have simply been lost.  
In this light the accession to the WTO presents itself as a watershed in
Russia’s history similar to that of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and
the  subsequent  reforms.  The  WTO  agreements  assume  that  economic
activities are alike (ignoring the factors described in Figure 1 above) and
consequently assume that the structural changes induced by free trade are
in  everybody’s  interests.  Economic  history  and  recent  decades  –  and
11 Vladimir Popov, ‘The Long Road to Normalcy’, UNI-WIDER Working Paper No 2010/3, 2010.
Brazil’s own lost decade of the 1980s pales in comparison to Russia’s experience. On Brazil, see
Leonardo Burlamaqui, Jose A. P. de Souza and Nelson H. Barbosa-Filho,’The rise and halt of eco-
nomic development in Brazil, 1945-2004: Industrial catching-up, institutional innovation, and finan-
cial fragility’, in Ha-Joon Chang, ed., Institutional Change and Economic Development. London:
Anthem, 2007, 239-259.
12 See, for perhaps the most infamous discussion of the impacts of Russia’s privatization policy dur-
ing 1990s the article by Lawrence King, David Stuckler and Martin McKee, ‘Mass privatisation and
the post-communist mortality crisis: a cross-national analysis’, The Lancet, 373, 9661, 399-407,
January 2009.Russia’s own experience in the 1990s – teach us that this is simply not so.
Free trade tends to reinforce pre-existing structural tendencies and com-
parative advantages: technologically developed areas (geographical agglom-
erations of knowledge and production) get richer, while areas dominated by
monoculture in raw materials and undiversified economies experience fur-
ther primitivization and retrogression. Learning from successful cases of
managing industrial policy under the WTO – what the rest of the BRIC
economies have long been doing – is perhaps the main issue for Russia’s
economic policy-making in the near future.
The other BRIC countries to a large extent owe their success to being
unsynchronized with the global cyclical fashions of economics that have
been described in the preceding paragraphs. Since the late 1940s, India and
China have consistently been following a strategy of industrialization. In the
case of both India and China, the lack of competition for a long time no
doubt hindered progress, but there is a growing recognition that the pres-
ent successes of these countries are a result of past strategies
13. As huge
countries India, China, and Brazil were all subject to ‘ideological inertia’ in
the sense that the neoliberal fad never penetrated as deeply as it did in the
smaller nations. In contrast to the other BRIC countries, the negative effects
of the neoliberal period caused severe and lasting damage to Russia’s pro-
ductive sectors (see the figures in Appendix I). While the Washington insti-
tutions managed to dismantle the industrial policies of the smaller Latin
American nations, BNDS – Brazil’s Development Bank – presently has a
larger capital base than the World Bank. It is in our opinion important to rec-
ognize that Russia has been extremely unfortunate in relation to the fads
and swings of the economics profession, and that it will take decades to
repair the damage done. 
The decline in GDP and output experienced by Russia, and by all other for-
mer Soviet republics and to a lesser degree Central European economies, in
the 1990s is relatively well documented and undisputed. According to the
World Bank’s calculations, the recession these countries went through in
the 1990s was in most cases worse than the Great Depression in the USA
and World War II in Western Europe (in both cases, countries affected
recovered considerably quicker).
14 In case of Russia and the BRIC countries,
Figure 3 depicts the well-known dynamics of GDP growth over the last half
century. 
12
13 In  the  case  of  India,  see  Deepak  Nayyar,  ‘Learning  to  Unlearn  from  Development’, Oxford
Development Studies, 36 (3), 2008, 259-280. 
14 World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, 2006, available
at http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/.  Figure 3. GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars, 1950-2008
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy. Historical Statistics, Paris: OECD, 2003, and The
Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, June
2010, http://www.conference-board.org/economics/  
Underneath such a drastic fall in GDP are similar dynamics in terms of value
added  produced  by  industry  and  by  other  sectors.  Figures  11-27  in
Appendix 1 show the rapid fall in value added produced particularly in
industry, and continuous lowering well into the 2000s as in the case of the
share of high and medium technology value added in manufacturing. This
is in stark contrast to the rest of the BRIC economies as well as with
dynamics in leading catching-up economies such as Korea, let alone with
leading developed countries such as the USA and Japan.
Russia’s  prowess  in  sciences,  particularly  mathematics,  is  proverbial.
Indeed, if we take a snapshot view of the knowledge intensity of the BRIC
economies – in terms of patents filed and money paid and received for
knowledge transactions – Russia is doing rather well, as shown in Figure 4.
In fact, Russia is not only outperforming all the other BRIC economies, but
also Eastern European members of the European Union. However, zooming
out and taking a long-term view reveals a more complex picture, depicted
in Figure 5.
While Russia, along with Brazil and India, has been able to rapidly increase
its share in world exports, its share in knowledge economy is in fact not
increasing at an equal pace. Korea and China are able to climb what we can
call a knowledge ladder: exporting a significant amount of their respective
outputs and simultaneously rapidly increasing the knowledge intensity of
the economy. Moreover, Russia’s growth in exports is mostly due to rise in
13fuel exports (see Figure14 in Appendix 1) and in terms of a science base
(measured here in a very robust way, in number of scientific articles),
15
Russia has in fact been rapidly losing ground to the other BRIC economies
(Figure 15).
16 
Figure 4. Snapshot of knowledge intensity, 2008
17
Source: WIPO, World Bank WDI Online database; calculations by the authors; x axis log scaled 
14
15 See also a recent OECD report on Russia’s innovation system, National Innovation System and
State Innovation Policy of the Russian Federation. Background Report to the OECD Country Review
of the Russian Innovation Policy, OECD, 2009.
16 For a most recent comparison of BRICS (including South Africa) innovation and R&D systems,
see José Eduardo Cassiolato and Virgínia Vitorino, BRICS and Development Alternatives. Innovation
Systems and Policies, London: Anthem, 2009. On the transition of the Russian R&D system, see
Slavo Radosevic, ‘Patterns of preservation, restructuring and survival: science and technology poli-
cy in Russia in post-Soviet era,’ Research Policy, 32(6), 1105-1124, 2003.
17 Data for patents are for 2006 and include all filings around the world; data for royalties and licens-
es are for 2008 and include both payments and receipts. Royalties and license fees include interna-
tional payments and receipts for the authorized use of intangible, non-produced, non-financial assets
and proprietary rights (such as patents, copyrights and industrial processes and designs). Hungary is
excluded from Eastern European calculations as it has a very high level of royalty and licensing fees
in GDP (1.99%).Figure 5. Knowledge ladder: Patents vs Share in World Exports (Goods and Services),
1996-2008
Source: WTO and WIPO; calculations by the authors; x axis log scaled
After the tumultuous 1990s, Russia has thus generally developed in the
opposite direction of the other BRIC and leading catching-up economies:
exports are undiversified, the share of high and medium technology pro-
duction is diminishing, and losing ground to the other countries in terms of
knowledge production.
There are more or less three broad explanations typically given for the rapid
collapse of Russia’s GDP in the 1990s. Two of the explanations spring from
the  same  ideological  well,  neoclassical  economics  cum  Washington
Consensus policies: first, it is argued, Russia’s trouble originated in the pro-
found mismanagement of the macroeconomic environment, particularly in
the inability to tame inflation.
18 Secondly, the transition from planned econ-
omy  to  market  economy  was  protracted  and  undermined  by  continued
trade controls (export quotas and import substitution).
19 A third argument
looks  at  long-term  institutional  development  in  Russia  and  argues  that
Russia’s  domestic  institution  building  has  always  been  complicated  by
copying Western solutions without heeding domestic needs, and that shock
therapy essentially threw out the baby with the bath water: non-function-
ing markets dismantled feeble institutions and undermined state capacity in
15
18 Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Why Russia has failed to stabilize’, 1995, available at http://www.earth.columbia.
edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/russia1995.pdf. 
19 Vladimir Konovalov, ‘Russian Trade Policy’, in Constantine Michalopoulos and David G. Tarr, eds,
Trade in the New Independent States, The World Bank/UNDP, 1994, 29-51.the process.
20 None of these, however, explain why Russia is still lagging
behind other BRIC and leading catching-up economies. In what follows, we
offer an alternative understanding of what happened to Russian industry in
the 1990s. We look at Russian economic dynamics through evolutionary
and Schumpeterian Other Canon lenses.
While some key neoclassical thinkers argue for an important role for indus-
trial and technology policy in development,
21 there is still one key aspect in
which industrial policy is often misunderstood, namely the role of technol-
ogy in development.
22 More specifically, there are strong disagreements as
to what causes and stimulates innovations in the private sector. On the one
hand,  the  evolutionary  tradition  argues  that  innovations  and  economic
growth in general take place because of knowledge and skill agglomeration
and continuous upgrading and technological change. On the other hand, the
neo-classical and also public-choice traditions argue that the main drivers
behind innovations and growth are trade and competition: the former using
the comparative advantage of nations to bring more, better and cheaper
goods to consumers (higher efficiency); the latter creating pressures for
companies to incessantly innovate and outcompete the competitors, and to
push prices down in the process (higher efficiency, again). This difference
goes back to a different understanding of the nature of technological devel-
opment and its impact on companies and economies. 
The evolutionary school argues that technological development is almost
always path-dependent; neo-classical arguments assume that technology is
essentially freely available to all, competitors and countries alike. The neo-
classical view also assumes that technological development is more or less
linear, towards ever more complex solutions yet with a rather clear path
ahead. Thus, while neoclassical economists set out to rectify market fail-
ures that prevent the dissemination of technologies and skills, in the eyes
of evolutionary economists, entrepreneurs seek technological innovation in
order to create market failures. To evolutionary economists, technological
development is anything but linear and technology is anything but freely
available.  Path  dependencies,  linkages,  spillovers,  externalities,  winner-
takes-all markets and highly imperfect and dynamic competition make tech-
nology an unpredictable, high-risk and possibly high-return endeavor. These
characteristics engender long-term structural changes in the economies in
form of technology trajectories, techno-economic paradigms and geograph-
ical agglomerations. 
16
20 Vladimir Popov, ‘The Long Road to Normalcy’, 2010.
21 Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth,
Princeton, NJ and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2007.
22 Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, Richard Nelson and Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Institutions and Policies Shaping
Industrial Development: An Introductory Note’, LEM Working Paper Series, 2/2006, 2006, available
at http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2006-02.pdf. Following  a  broadly  evolutionary  approach,  we  assume  that  companies
innovate in order to hedge their balance sheets; that is, companies innovate
in order to generate revenues and outcompete their competitors, and they
do so in a number of ways, e.g. by developing new or improved products
and services, or by introducing organizational or marketing changes, etc. In
trying to hedge their balance sheets through innovations companies rely on
skills and routines they have developed, or as Alfred Chandler called this,
companies rely on ‘learned organizational capabilities’ that include technical
know-how, management and marketing skill, established networks etc.
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These capabilities, however, develop and evolve in a wider context which
can be called a national system of innovation that can have a huge variety
of features from the legal system to particularities of education and R&D.
24
In the early 1990s the Washington institutions assumed that Russia need-
ed to deal with two fundamental challenges of transition: to align domestic
prices with world markets and to restructure the Soviet industry. While lib-
eralization of prices and tariffs
25 was supposed to deliver the first, restruc-
turing was to take place through processes of import spillovers and exter-
nalities.
26 The argument rested on the logic that foreign investors bring with
them new technology and skills that in turn force domestic producers to imi-
tate the foreign competitors and in the process upgrade their own respec-
tive technological and production capabilities. 
However, as rapid liberalization threatened and also in reality resulted in
high inflation and rapid fall in ruble value in the early days of the transition,
import externalities could not take place, as domestic products were mas-
sively  cheaper.  Thus,  upon  the  advice  of  the  Washington  Institutions,
Russia  embarked  on  stabilization  through  exchange  rate  appreciation  in
order to both curb inflation and raise competitiveness of imports to promote
industrial restructuring.
27 From the evolutionary Other Canon viewpoint this
was, however, bound to lead to a catastrophe for domestic producers.
Soviet industrial companies, and the industry in general, were built up and
ran in a complex cluster-like web of planning and competition; the produc-
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23 Alfred Chandler, Inventing the Electronic Century. The Epic Story of the Consumer Electronics
and Computer Industries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005; and Richard Nelson and
Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1982.
24 Chris Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, London: Routledge, 1974.
25 Tariffs, however, played a relatively minor role in the early transition period, being kept low around
12% on average and only in 1994 some tariffs rose rapidly (car production, agriculture, defense);
see Konovalov, ‘Russian Trade Policy’, 1994, 30 and 39-40.
26 Dani Rodrik, ‘’Disequilibrium’ exchange rates as industrialization policy’, Journal of Development
Economics, 23(1), 89-106, 1986.
27 See summary of arguments in Vladimir Popov, ‘Recovery and adjustment after the Russian 1998
currency crisis’, in Jayati Ghosh and C.P. Chandrasekhar, eds, After Crisis - Adjustment, Recovery
and Fragility in East Asia, New Dehli: Tulika, 2009, 245-269tion was generally highly vertically integrated. Perversely mirroring the clus-
ter-like characteristic of Soviet industrial activities, the R&D system was
based on similar vertical integration of R&D into specialized institutions that
were, however, separated from the production companies. With the liber-
alization of prices and trade in January 1992, and as government planning
of production and distribution ceased to exist, most companies saw drastic
drops in their exports to other former Soviet republics and Central European
economies.
28 While raw materials based exports proved relatively resilient
in 1992-1993, Russian machinery exports dropped from 13 billion USD to
5 billion USD.
29 At the same time relatively recent capital investments in
new production technology were rather common for Russian companies: in
1990, in the machinery sector, more than 50% of the production technol-
ogy was less than 5 years old.
30 That means most of these companies had
a large amount of capital investments that they could not yet amortize and
thus the companies with the highest relative fixed costs to variable costs
(these tend also to be the technologically most advanced ones) were hit the
hardest as their balance sheets worsened very quickly. If a company has a
lot of machinery and equipment to be amortized, i.e. there have been recent
investments into upgrading, this company will be particularly harshly hit if
its demand drops and it comes under financial stress because of liabilities
to the banking sector. Thus, by definition, the most advanced industries
were hit first and also hardest by the free trade shock, i.e. by rapid liberal-
ization. This is called the Vanek-Reinert effect: a free trade shock will kill
the most advanced sectors in the least advanced trading area first. The last
to survive will be subsistence agriculture. 
In addition, as demand disappeared, particularly in the former Soviet trad-
ing area, it meant that most industrial value chains and all-important link-
ages between different producers collapsed. Linkages between producers,
also called innovation pathways, simultaneously enforce and enable com-
panies to learn new ways of producing things, by experimenting and con-
sequently improving their processes and products. Once these linkages col-
lapse  rebuilding  them  is  almost  impossible  because  of  labour  mobility,
unlearning through idleness, and because entrepreneurs move into activities
with higher profit possibility which may, however, not exhibit similar devel-
opment potential as technologically-based activities. 
However, as we can see in Figure 6, the Vanek-Reinert effect was made
much worse in Russia by the exchange rate appreciation during 1993-
1995. Obviously this appreciation made imports much more competitive, as
18
28 Konovalov, ‘Russian Trade Policy’, 1994, 34, table 2.3.
29 Ibid., 36.
30 Narodnoe Hosjaistvo SSSR v 1990 g., Moscow, 1991, 316.retail sales hardly changed throughout this period, and at the same time it
made domestic producers lose their competitiveness. Figures 11-26 docu-
ment the unprecedented fall in production (both in industry and agriculture)
in Russia in the 1990s. These figures show the surprisingly large dynamics
inherent in Russia’s economy up to the late 1980s: almost all economic
activities experienced strong growth in output. This was followed by an
astonishing fall of production in most sectors and, as the figures show,
some activities became virtually extinct. However, this also means, that not
only does production and employment fall radically in sectors with high
learning potential, but the ‘pathways of innovation’ have collapsed. In other
words, the Russian National Innovation System was severely damaged. 
Figure 6. Exchange rate, real wages and production in Russia, 1992-2001
Source: Russian Economic Trends, available at http://www.recep.ru/phase4/en/ret/retdb.htm 
Figure 7 shows the direct link between the overvaluation of the rouble and
the damage done to the productive sector.
19Figure 7. Russia’s industrial production before and after devaluation in 1998
Source: Russian Economic Trends, available at http://www.recep.ru/phase4/en/ret/retdb.htm.; see
also Popov, ‘Recovery and adjustment’, 2009
It is clear that the 1998 financial crisis and the devaluation of the rouble
helped local producers regain some of their competitiveness. Also, Russian
economic policy has changed considerably since the early 1990s. This pol-
icy evolution can be divided into three periods starting in 1990. First, 1992-
1998, the period of destructive destruction documented above. Second,
1998-2004, a period we would call gilded recovery, as devaluation enabled
some of the production to pick up again, also tariff policy clearly helped in
some fields (e.g. car production, poultry), and the rise in global energy
prices flooded Russia with petrodollars. But this period is also characterized
by  rapidly  falling  real  wages  –  and  consequently  a  collapse  of  overall
demand – and rapid growth in income inequality while social indicators con-
tinued worsening (e.g. human development index
31). The third period, start-
ing with Vladimir Putin’s first presidency in 2004, can be seen as an area
of emerging state capitalism or, particularly after 2008, as neo-develop-
mentalist.
32 While Putin during his first term actively sought Russian mem-
bership in the WTO, his second term as president brought a marked differ-
ence, not only rhetorically but also in terms of actual policy. Indeed, Putin’s
Russia has been ’accused’ by neo-liberalists of pursuing industrial policy.
33
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31 See Popov, ‘Recovery and adjustment’, 2009.
32 Rawi Abdelal, ‘The Promise and peril of Russia’s resurgent state’, Harvard Business Review, Jan-
Feb, 2010, 1-6.
33  Anders Åslund, ‘Why doesn’t Russia join the WTO?’, The Washington Quarterly, April 2010, 49-
63, available at http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr_Aslund.pdf. It appears that Russia is consciously delaying its entrance into the WTO
agreements; instead, Russia is set to experiment with various industrial pol-
icy means such as priority industrial sectors, local content requirements,
public procurement for innovation, import tariffs, etc. However, from the
destructive destruction of 1992-1998 Russia has inherited an industrial sec-
tor with particular capabilities. In order to understand the dynamics of how
Russia’s industrial capabilities – capabilities for innovation – have evolved
over  the  past  decades,  it  is  useful  to  compare  these  to  other  BRIC
economies. Figure 8 attempts schematically to summarize these compara-
tive dynamics.
In comparison to the other BRIC economies, Russia saw particularly its pro-
duction and R&D capabilities forging ahead of the rest up to the mid or late
1980s. Chris Freeman and Carlota Perez have argued that the Soviet indus-
trial system coped relatively well with the mass production paradigm that
came to be exhausted by the early 1980s.
34 The switch to the information
technology led production paradigm, based as it is on production and inno-
vation networks, was something that the Soviet planning system could not
cope with. This shock therapy meant that the other BRIC economies rapid-
ly started catching up with Russia, and in particular in their production and
export capabilities eclipsed Russia within a decade. While Russia still enjoys
relatively strong R&D capabilities, as we saw above, the dynamics speak
clearly for the other BRIC economies, and not for Russia.
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34 Chris Freeman, ‘The ‘National System of Innovation’ in historical perspective’, Cambridge Journal
of Economics, 19, 1995, 5-24; and Carlota Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital:
The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002. Figure 8. Evolution of Russian industrial and technological capabilities in relation to the
rest of the BRIC economies
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While it is noticeable that other BRIC countries are parties to WTO agree-
ments, it is more than significant that especially India and China never real-
ly succumbed to the Washington Consensus type of policies. Indeed, also
within the WTO China and India, and increasingly also Brazil, have become
powerful countries with their own clear agenda that they are also increas-
ingly able to push through. So for instance all three countries have made
significant changes to their intellectual property laws that, while WTO (that
is TRIPS) compliant, give important advantages to domestic producers.
36
Similarly, India and China, less Brazil, have been noticeable exceptions in
not allowing total freedom for foreign investors and capital movement.
37 In
other words, the other BRIC economies have been fast learning how to reap
benefits from the WTO membership, and at the same time generate policies
22
35 Under production capabilities we mean such features as diversity and clustering of production,
feedback linkages among producers, inter-sectoral linkages, etc; by R&D capabilities we mean both
tacit and codified knowledge creation (patents, articles, product development networks); and by
export capabilities we mean both volume and diversity of exports.
36 Jerome H. Reichman, ‘Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing
Countries Lead or Follow?’, Houston Law Review, 46(4), 2009.
37 José Antonio Ocampo and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Capital Market Liberalization and Develop-
ment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
R&D capabilitiesfor domestic capabilities building. This is something that Russia has seem-
ingly not yet learned how to do. In light of the above analysis, Russia is well
advised to take up more seriously an industrial policy aiming at domestic
expansion. 
The challenges faced by Russia are by no means unique. Indeed, it can be
argued that most catching-up economies today face similar challenges that
can be summarized under the heading of diminishing returns to integration
into the global economy. Figure 9 shows that outside the West, only Asia
has escaped rapidly falling growth rates following the introduction of the
Washington Consensus policies. 
Figure 9. Development Economics lost. Growth rate of GDP per capita in selected world
regions; regional average in selected periods between 1820 and 2001; annual average
compound growth rate
Source: Data from Angus Maddison, The World Economy. Historical Statistics, Paris: OECD, 2003;
calculations by the authors
Even in highly innovative fields such as information and communication
technologies, catching-up country innovation hubs (technology parks, pro-
duction agglomerations, etc) may experience diminishing returns to network
integration. In electronics, for instance, ‘Asian labs remain focused primari-
ly on repetitive detailed engineering and product development tasks.’
38 In
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38 Dieter Ernst, A New Geography of Knowledge in the Electronics Industry? Asia’s Role in Global
Innovation Networks, East West Center, Policy Studies, No 54, 2009, 29. other words, despite growing high- tech exports and R&D expenditures,
many  catching-up  countries  may  experience  ‘commodification’  (perfect
competition which makes it difficult to maintain high wages). Indeed, catch-
ing-up and developing countries might both seem to industrialize (measured
by an increasing share of industry in GDP) and catch up technologically
(measured by a raising share of ‘high tech’ exports), yet none of these indi-
cators necessarily imply an increased capacity to develop, and to pay high-
er real wages. This is because domestic linkages may remain weak, while
intense global competition keeps wages and profits low. To the contrary,
there seems to be evidence of emerging high-tech enclaves in developing
country innovation which create few linkages and synergies with other
domestic actors (industry, research labs and the public sector). Such ten-
dencies repeat themselves in a host of catching up economies, from Estonia
to Mexico. This, perhaps, is the strongest reason why the Washington
Institutions again are talking about industrial policy. Trade, foreign invest-
ments and openness are simply not enough to deliver sustainable growth in
terms of technology, employment, high wages, and finance.
Industrial policy came to be discredited in the 1980s by juxtaposing two
seemingly  different  development  traditions:  East  Asia’s  rise  and  Latin
America’s  retrogression  starting  in  the  mid-1970s  (the  so  called  ‘lost
decades’ of Latin America). However, this was only possible by showing,
first, that East Asia’s rise was based on classical Ricardian comparative
advantage, using exports as an ‘engine of growth’, and secondly, that Latin
America’s problems had its roots in failed or at least mismanaged import
substitution industrialization, closely related to classical development eco-
nomics. In both cases, this was only one side of the coin: exports were only
a part of the success story in East Asia’s rapid rise, and rather than import
substitution per se, it was the free trade shock – foreshadowing what
would hit Russia about 15 years later – that destroyed the productive sec-
tors of the small Latin American countries.  
East Asia’s story was told in a way as if feedback linkages and positive
externalities emerging in these economies through state-led industrializa-
tion played only an exogenous role in these countries’ development. That
is, because technology and innovation were simply left out of the story it
was possible to draw a rather simplistic conclusion: export-led growth is
what works in development countries. Latin America’s problems, in turn,
were seen through a double prism of inflation and rent-seeking, without,
however, realizing that increasing foreign private lending in the 1970s also
spurred the consumption engine into higher gear while domestic produc-
tion collapsed due to a free trade shock. This was bound to lead to cur-
rent account problems (through imports) and eventually towards long-last-
ing financial fragility that undermined industrialization efforts, not the other
way  around.  That  is,  the  role  of  the  post-Bretton  Woods  international
24financial architecture was ignored and, in fact, together with the newly
learned ‘lessons’ from East Asia about export-led growth, financial liberal-
ization was seen as the main source of the much-needed capital for the
export-led growth model. 
Significantly, both misinterpretations marked a break with a long-standing
development tradition reaching back to the Renaissance
39 – that was, how-
ever, also supported by many, if not most, neo-classical economists at the
time – namely, that infant industry protection is a necessary if not sufficient
condition for industrialization and diversification. Also John Williamson’s
original list of Washington Consensus policies did include infant industry
protection, and ‘a moderate general tariff (in the range of 10 percent to 20
percent, with little dispersion) might be accepted as a mechanism to pro-
vide a bias toward diversifying the industrial base without threatening seri-
ous costs’.
40
With these misinterpretations, however, not only were real developments
misunderstood, equally important is to note that comparing East Asian and
Latin American development experiences yields key lessons about the suc-
cess and failure of industrial policy. More precisely, perhaps the key lesson
is that protectionism does not equal protectionism: just as there is a huge
variety of capitalisms, protectionism can also take many forms. If develop-
ment history teaches us that infant industry protection is a conditio sine qua
non, then it is exactly the comparison of two very recent instances of this
strategy that can teach us the reasons for success and failure. Indeed,
based on these two historical experiences, we can create two ‘ideal types’
of protectionism and, more importantly, of industrial policy. In Table 3, we
try to distill from vast and diverse historical data and different contexts two
such ‘ideal types’.
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Constable, 2007.
40 John  Williamson,  ‘What  Washington  Means  by  Policy  Reform’,  available  at  http://www.iie.
com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=486, 2002 (updated version of his 1990 article).Table 3: Ideal types of protectionism compared
Comparing the two, it is clear that the key differences between these ‘ideal
types’ rest on the following: First, the idea that development needs specif-
ic economic activities that exhibit long-term potential in terms of learning
curves, dynamic imperfect competition, increasing real wages home-market
expansion  and  exports.  Such  activities  provide  nation-wide  synergetic
increasing returns. These, in turn, create possibilities for continuous upgrad-
ing through policies targeting education and the labor market. This is what
East Asian countries did; while after the mid-1970s Latin American coun-
tries (with the exception of Brazil) failed to target windows of opportunities
in different activities while the need for local competitive pressure was
underestimated. Second, the failure to create dynamic economies of scale
led to financial fragility, particularly when foreign capital inflows and lend-
ing became prevalent elements in the development strategy, as happened
in Latin America in the 1980s. Combined with the basics of the current ICT-
led  techno-economic  paradigm,  the  lessons  from  previous  successful
instances of industrial policy should form the core of the emerging Russian
developmental state.
A key feature of the developmental state is its financing of development.
While the financial system will in general evolve with changes in technolo-
gy, these changes will not necessarily be those most appropriate to the sup-
port of technological development. Fostering the appropriate innovation in
the financial structure should be part of government technology policy.
Generally the financial system is regulated in order to provide financial sta-
26bility or to control inflation. However, this overlooks the most important role
of  the  financial  system  in  the  implementation  of  technological  develop-
ment.
41 Governments regulate the financial system and task central banks
to provide growth of employment or stability of prices, but seldom take
measures to ensure that the financial system provides the support for tech-
nological development that is the very foundation of economic stability and
development.
One means of fostering these changes is through the creation of a nation-
al development bank that can provide support for private sector risk-taking
by financial institutions. An alternative that is followed in the United States
is for government departments interested in technological development to
form independent venture capital funds that support the best technological
designs in the required area.
42 An important part of this support is not only
the provision of financing, but also ensuring the commercial viability of the
enterprise that produces the desired technological development. This sup-
port can include a guaranteed purchase but also help in developing a com-
mercially viable product that can sustain the enterprise in addition to gov-
ernment financial support. In this way the private sector provides financial
support for targeted areas of development. Obvious areas for such policies
are in national defense, energy policy, environmental investments, and pub-
lic procurement in general. 
Conclusion
This document has argued that – both compared to the country’s past and
its vast possibilities – Russia’s economy produces far from its theoretical
Production Possibility Frontier, i.e. the point where all the nation’s factors
of production, capital, labour and brainpower are fully utilized. The graphs
in Appendix I show this convincingly. This idea is represented in Figure 10,
where the solid outer line represents the potential output, and the dotted
inner line represents Russia’s present situation. This situation creates a very
strong argument for heavy industrial policy, also in the neo-classical eco-
nomic tradition on which neoliberalism built. 
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Schumpeterian and Minskyian Approach’, in Silvana de Paula and Gary A. Dimsky, eds, Reimagining
Growth – Towards a Renewal of Development Theory, London and New York: Zed Books, 2005,
141-167. 
42 Fred Block, ‘Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the
United States’, Politics & Society, 36(2), 2008, 169-206.Figure 10. Russia’s Production Possibility Frontiers
Any economic strategy must learn from the destructive destruction that
took place in the 1990s (see Figure 3) but also from the success stories.
For  example,  what  lies  behind  the  spectacular  recent  success  of  the
Russian poultry industry (Figure 15, in Appendix I)? How can this success
be replicated in other areas of industry and agriculture? The analysis must
be based on the shift in priorities which is outlined in Table 2 in the docu-
ment: a new emphasis on the production of goods and services, away from
the focus on finance and trade.
Emphasis must be made on learning from actual policy experiences of other
countries, not on the ideologies ‘sold’ by these countries. In other words:
‘Don’t do what the Americans tell you to do, do what the Americans did’. 
In Appendix II we have listed ‘Ten Theses for a New Developmentalism’
which – as part of a project funded by the Ford Foundation – was recent-
ly produced by a group of economists meeting in São Paulo. This list is use-
ful in a Russian context because it in many ways represents the antithesis
of the Washington Consensus that created so much havoc in Russia’s pro-
ductive sectors in the 1990s. 
This document is just a preliminary report to a larger project, so our key rec-
ommendations are outlined only as bullet point below:
28• Income differences between individuals are largely determined by
the  choice  of  economic  activity.  Surgeons  have  higher  income
than hospital cleaning ladies. The same mechanisms are at work
between nations: what the nation produces will to a large extent
determine its relative level of income. Figure 1 and Table 3 in this
report outline the differences between activities that are ‘good’
and those which are ‘bad’ for a nation. Any efficient industrial poli-
cy must bear these elements in mind. 
• The present production profile of Russia’s industry is of a kind which
– under increased free trade – creates a high risk that the Russian 
population at large may specialize in staying relatively poor.  
• This means that, in the opinion of the authors, Russia is not ready 
for a WTO membership. However, a free trade area with Russia’s
neighbors is likely to produce benefits to all parties (in Asian deve-
lopment terminology, this could create a ‘flying geese’ pattern of
development).
• Russia’s modernization – we have called it ‘Modernization Round
III’ – must be based on the same principles of Russia’s two previ-
ously  successful  modernization  strategies,  those  of  Peter  the
Great and Sergei Witte, but once again taking the new technolo-
gical context (the techno-economic paradigm) into consideration.  
• Russia ought to establish a detailed and targeted industrial policy 
(see also the policy outline in Appendix II) that aims at replicating the
success e.g. of the poultry industry. A detailed study of Russian 
imports should be established in order to pin-point areas where a 
minimum of policy (and tariff) intervention is likely to produce a maxi-
mum effect in terms of employment and national added value. 
• A vast country like Russia must have policies both for high-tech, 
medium-tech, and low-tech industries. Denmark is an example of 
a country which has created employment and value in relatively
low-tech industries within a high-tech setting.
• The housing sector appears to be a candidate for a large-scale inno-
vation-based public initiative, also as regards energy-efficiency.
• The regional dimension needs particular emphasis. A country embrac-
ing nine time zones needs strong regional policies. Regional policy is
very important within the European Union. On an EU map of Europe
more than 90 per cent of the geographical area receive some kind of
regional subsidy. As has been done in the United States, the regio-
nal aspects could be studied in the form of cluster analyses. Europe
and the United States have themselves not followed the strategies
that their economists recommended in Russia. 
• Selective strengthening of the agricultural sector must be given
priority. Regional policy depends on the presence of an agricultu-
ral sector. The relatively good performance of Poland compared to 
its neighbors, e.g. the Baltic countries, is partly due to a private 
29agricultural sector which provides a buffer – reducing open urban 
unemployment  and  social  exclusion  –  when  industrial  activities
fluctuate. 
• As shown by the examples of Peter the Great and Sergei Witte,
infrastructure  is  a  key  element  in  any  national  modernization. 
Building a national and international network of high-speed rail-
ways seems to be the best candidate.  
• Russia needs to establish a strong development bank that can be
the executive branch of the development strategy and handle the 
needs of large, medium size, and small producers. We recommend 
Brazil’s BNDS as a role model. At present this Brazilian develop-
ment bank handles more funds than the World Bank.
• While the gas and petroleum sector provides very useful foreign 
exchange, there is the risk that this sector may hamper the long-
term development of the country. The risk of an overvalued ruble
that makes Russian industry non-competitive internationally is only 
one  of  the  risks  associated  with  the  group  of  problems  often
referred to as ‘Dutch Disease’. Norway and its emphasize on finan-
cial investment instead of investments in the nation’s own pro-
ductive sector is decidedly an example not to follow in this case.  
• It  must  be  attempted  to  link  the  excellent  scientific  production  in 
Russia to commercial production in Russia itself. A conscious brain-
gain policy (promoting the return of skilled emigrants) – for a while
successfully tried in Ireland and Taiwan – could be part of this strategy. 
• Entrepreneurship  must  be  taught  and  encouraged  at  all  levels. 
Historically – starting with England in the 1500s – foreign entrepre-
neurship has proved to be much more important that foreign capital.  
• In the context of development policies in Latin America US econo-
mist Albert Hirschman coined the term Fracasomanía, meaning the 
tendency in several Latin American countries to picture their own 
destiny as one of automatic fracasos, or failures. A kind of eco-
nomic nihilism. Fracasomanía, including giving up to the destruc-
tive forces of corruption, is one trap Russia must avoid. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind that although China and Zimbabwe achieve
virtually the same score on the corruption index, one country is
developing very fast while the other is retrogressing economically.   
• Fracasomanía must be avoided, together with the idea that only
two policy possibilities exist, planned economy or neoliberalism. In 
reality, there are virtually endless alternative types of capitalism, 
and  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  two  irrational  political 
extremes  –  planned  economy  and  extreme  liberalism  (today’s 
neoliberalism)–  were  both  declared  dead  by  the  continental 
European economists who created the Welfare State already more 
than 100 years ago. In spite of this, these two irrational utopias
have continued to haunt Russian policy-making until today.       
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Figure 11. Manufacturing value added per capita, 1993-2003
Source: UNIDO
Figure 12. Share of high and medium technology value added in manufacturing value
added, 1993-2003
Source: UNIDO
31Figure 13. Value added by sector, Russia, 1990-2008
Source: World Bank WDI online database
Figure 14. Share of Fuel Exports in Merchandise Exports, 1996-2003
Source: World Bank WDI online database
32Figure 15. Number of Scientific Articles, 1993-2005
Source: World Bank WDI online database
Figure 16. Russian production of meat, 1970-2008; 1970=100; thousand tons
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
33Figure  17. Russian  production  of  flour,  grain  and  bakery  products,  1970-2008;
1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
Figure 18. Russian production of poultry, semi-processed meat and sausages; 1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
34Figure 19. Russian production of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes; 1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
Figure 20. Russian production of textiles; 1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
35Figure 21. Russian production of coke, oil, gasoline and diesel fuel; 1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
Figure 22. Russian production of chemicals and medicine; 1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
36Figure 23. Russian production of machinery; 1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
Figure 24. Russian production of electrical domestic appliances; 1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
37Figure  25. Russian  production  of  trolley  buses,  cargo  vehicles,  cars  and  buses;
1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
Figure 26. Russian production of agricultural produce; 1970=100
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
38Figure 27. Russian livestock population; millions
Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service, databases available at http://www.gks.ru/eng/; calcula-
tions by the authors
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Ten theses on New Developmentalism 
On May 24 and 25 of 2010, a group of economists sharing a Keynesian
and structuralist development macroeconomics approach convened in São
Paulo to discuss ten theses on New Developmentalism – the name that
some of them have been using for some years to describe the national
development  strategy  that  middle  income  countries  are  today  using  or
should use to promote development and economic catching up.  
The meeting was part of the Financial Governance and the New Develop-
mentalism project, financed by the Ford Foundation. The project has as its
background the failure of the Washington Consensus to promote growth in
Latin America and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that showed the limits
and dangers involved in financial globalization and financial deregulation.  
The workshop was held in the aftermath of the biggest financial crisis in
history  in  which  was  evident  the  impact  of  open  capital  markets  on
exchange rates and the prices of tradable goods. G20 and individual
countries are now building the required regulation of financial markets.
Given that and the repeated financial crises in middle income developing
countries, the general objective of the workshop was to evaluate how
effective  a  new  developmentalism  strategy  might  be  in  promoting
growth with stability. 
The specific objective was to discuss ten theses on new developmentalism
that participants had been asked to think about in advance of the meeting.
After two days of lively discussion, the local organizers of the workshop
were charged with editing the theses to reflect the debate.  The final ver-
sion has now been endorsed by the original participants of the workshop.
Other economists and social scientists committed to the idea of economic
growth with stability and social equity are now also invited to subscribe.  
1. Economic development is a structural process of fully utilizing all
available domestic resources to provide the maximum sustainable
rate of capital accumulation building on incorporation of technical
progress. The primary objective is to provide full employment of
available labor resources. Not only should this  involve  increasing 
productivity in each industry, it also involves finance and the con-
tinuous transfer of labor to industries producing goods and servi-
ces with higher value added per capita and paying higher wages 
and salaries.   
2. Markets are the major locus of this process, but the state has a 
strategic role in providing the appropriate institutional framework
to support this structural process. This includes promoting a finan-
cial  structure  and  financial  institutions  that  channel  domestic 
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duce high rates of increase in domestic value added. This frame-
work should also include measures aimed at overcoming structu-
ral imbalances and promoting international competitiveness. 
3. In the context of globalization, economic development requires a
national development strategy which seizes global opportunities
i.e. global economies of scale and multiple sources of technologi-
cal learning, mitigates barriers to innovation created by excessive-
ly strong intellectual property regimes, assures financial stability,
and creates investment opportunities to private entrepreneurs.  
4. Although the Schumpeterian side of the development process and
strategic industrial policy are relevant, the demand side is where
the major growth bottlenecks unfold. Since Keynes it has been
widely  recognized  that  supply  does  not  automatically  create
demand. However, in developing countries there are two additio-
nal structural tendencies that limit demand and investment: the
tendency of wages to increase at rates below the growth of the
productivity, and a structural tendency to overvaluation of the real
and/or nominal exchange rate. 
5. The tendency of wages to increase more slowly than productivity
growth is due to the existence of an abundant supply of labor and
of the political economy of labor markets.  Besides limiting domes-
tic  demand  and  reinforcing  income  concentration  in  the  higher
classes,  this  tendency  can  also  affect  long  term  productivity 
growth negatively. A legal minimum wage, cash transfers to the
poor, and principally a government guarantee to provide employ-
ment at a living wage could be used to neutralize this tendency to
underpay  labor.  The  alternative  –  chronic  overvaluation  of  the
national currency that increases purchasing power– is not a sus-
tainable strategy. 
6. The  tendency  to  cyclical  overvaluation  of  the  exchange  rate in
developing countries has been due to both the excessive reliance
on external savings in the form of foreign capital flows and the
Dutch disease in the context of excessively open capital markets
and lack of appropriate regulation. This tendency implies that the
exchange rate in developing countries is not just volatile, but it
also contributes to recurrent currency crises and recurrent bubbles
in the financial markets. It also implies that export oriented invest-
ment opportunities are chronically insufficient because exchange
rate overvaluation renders even the most efficient business enter-
prises uncompetitive internationally.  
7. Dutch disease may be characterized as a permanent overvaluation
of the national currency due to Ricardian rents originated from the
export of  commodities based on natural resources or exports based
on ultra cheap labor. Dutch disease impedes other tradable indus-
tries from prospering. It does so by creating a wedge between the
41“current account equilibrium exchange rate” (the exchange rate that
balances  the  current  account)  and  the  “industrial  equilibrium 
exchange rate” – the exchange rate that allows tradable industries
to be competitive utilizing state-of-the-art technology.
8. Economic  development  should  be  financed  essentially  with 
domestic savings. In order to achieve this goal, the creation of 
public financial institutions to ensure full utilization of domestic
resources,  in  particular  labor,  finance  innovation  and  support
investment is required. The attempt to use foreign savings via cur-
rent account deficits usually does not increase the investment rate
(as claimed by orthodox economics), but instead increases domes-
tic indebtedness and reinforces financial instability. Growth strate-
gies that rely on foreign savings cause financial fragility; get govern-
ments caught up in regressive “confidence building” games; and, all 
too often end with a balance of payments or currency crisis.
9. In order to provide the appropriate framework for development the 
government must ensure a stable long term relation between the
public debt and GDP and a real exchange rate that takes account 
of the need to counter the adverse effects on the manufacturing 
industry of Dutch disease.  
10. To achieve long term development economic policies should pur-
sue full employment as its primary goal, while assuring price and
financial stability. These ten propositions are not intended to be a 
comprehensive recipe for development. Rather they are intended
to be a set of propositions that a wide array of economists can
subscribe to. These propositions should be adjusted according to 
a  proper  mix,  specific  to  each  domestic  productive,  social  and
political context.  
Nothing has been said about the global financial and trade architecture
which are clearly matters that need attention in the new environment of
globalization that binds economies so closely together, often in forms of
adverse competition.
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